NBA Draft Winners

With the NBA Draft complete, fans may be giddy or groaning after their teams’ activities and too distracted to follow the whole of the event. While all of the attention focused on the draft has squarely been set on the first few picks, successes and hope should be found all the way through the 60 picks. This, however, is a simplified breakdown of three cases that I believe have strongly improved in one night’s time.

Minnesota Timberwolves

Okay, this one is practically a given. Karl-Anthony Towns is a promising talent, and the only matter of luck in getting to select him in the draft was winning the lottery with the best odds. However, I feel the trade netting Tyus Jones was a major steal. Capitalizing on the Cleveland Cavaliers’ desire to ship off the guaranteed money set aside for a first round pick, the Timberwolves turned second round picks into a dependable backup point guard. It takes Zach LaVine off the ball and provides a strong floor general as an understudy to Ricky Rubio, which is particularly valuable considering his injury history. Concerns about Jones’ defensive abilities won’t suddenly go away, but having Gorgui Dieng and/or Towns in the paint will hide some inevitable mistakes. Getting a cornerstone at the top of the draft was easy; finding another substantial piece without losing anything was magnificent.

Orlando Magic

The Magic had an opportunity to draft Emmanuel Mudiay, but are apparently comfortable with what they have in Elfrid Payton. Instead, they picked up a prized shooter in Mario Hezonja, whose game is not limited to sitting behind the arc. A confident athlete, Hezonja is not afraid to go up and down the court and throw his body into the paint, though he does not seem to attempt to draw contact. While he is somewhat strong in pick-and-roll, he has some turnover issues, but with Payton and Victor Oladipo, he won’t have to handle the ball extensively. He and second round selection Tyler Harvey add desperately needed scoring threats to a Magic team that was sixth-worst in scoring per game and fourth-worst in offensive efficiency last season.

Branden Dawson

The Michigan State product is an incredible offensive rebounder with an instinctive ability to block shots. That being said, his skills and body frame are not an ideal match for an NBA player; he is built like a small forward, but does not have the shooting or ball-handling skills to play on the perimeter. I have long been a fan of his, but never very hopeful that he would make it into the NBA. And while being drafted certainly doesn’t mean he will make a roster, it means there was enough interest in him that his rights had to be scooped up. As an undrafted free agent, Dawson would have been able to negotiate where he went for Summer League play. Despite the prominence of the draft-and-stash tactic at the end of the draft, the Los Angeles Clippers — through a trade with the New Orleans Pelicans — felt pressed into grabbing him. Being drafted, particularly by a team that wasn’t just waiting at the end of the draft, was an intriguing indication that Dawson’s skills have a legitimate appeal to NBA teams, and if he doesn’t catch on with the Clippers, there may be interest elsewhere.

The NBA Draft is not only an opportunity to refresh or redefine teams’ rosters, it has an unfathomable impact on young players trying to reach the highest level of competition. The suggestion that the process should immediately be narrowed down to categorizing those involved as “winners” or “losers” is ultimately ludicrous. Of course, there are teams that very likely missed out on players at the top of their boards and fans may be disappointed, but being involved at all is inherently a win.

Potential and “Potential”: Addressing Fans’ Uncertainty About Kristaps Porzingis

Any player taken Thursday in the NBA Draft is bound to take their bumps and bruises. There is no way around that. They will be rookies entering a league brimming with elite athletes, many of which can’t break into their teams’ rotations or even their rosters. There is absolutely no guarantee any of them will succeed; any number of things can hinder their careers.

Even so, their entry into the league exhilarates so many fans. Because there is potential. It is an overwhelming belief that improvement is inevitable, that what we see now will be altogether better in several years’ time.

But that is potential, not “potential.”

Potential is when we have seen what is and imagine we can grasp what will be. We ascribe concrete dimensions to potential through physical measurements and eye tests. There is something attainable, real about potential. It exists because prospects are exposed to our ever-prying curiosity as early as possible.

But that is potential, not “potential.”

“Potential” is riddled with doubt. It is an amorphous rumor without a face. It’s a name we struggle to pronounce and take no care learning to say correctly. It is “years away.” “Potential” is burdened by unknowing.

And so is Kristaps Porzingis.

The 19-year-old Latvian is a mystery to many NBA fans’ eyes. His slender seven-foot-plus frame eludes our vision; he slips through the cracks of our pseudo-scouting excursions. He doesn’t register on our radars because they don’t scan far enough to reach him.

Porzingis gets dismissed as a prospect because there is very little expectation that he will contribute much of anything for a few years. There is bound to be a complication or two adjusting to the differences between playing in the ACB League in Spain and stateside in the NBA. The game isn’t a completely foreign beast — basketball is basketball — but he will have to adjust to the stressed emphasis in weakside help defense, which won’t just change the way in which he plays defense, but will also clog floor space much more quickly on offense. And he may struggle moving the ball against close-outs as he has not demonstrated a consistent willingness to pass with less than half an assist per game over the last three years.

He will need time to grow, there’s no reasonable way to deny that. He needs to add weight — a fact he is aware of and seems to accept, since he spent last summer working with trainer Joe Abunassar (owner of IMPACT Basketball) and returned there this summer in better shape after following the regiment for the whole year.

That’s where executives and scouts gathered to watch his only workout performance before the draft, and where Chad Ford collected the insights of such experts on Porzingis. Ford sought to know whether Porzingis deserved consideration as a candidate to go first overall in the draft, and while most everyone quoted gushed about his abilities, the idea was still met with a bit of resistance. But it had nothing to do with him as a basketball player; the problem rested in his status as an international player — an unknown, unseen player that has not demonstrated his potential within the scrutiny of our own culture. His experience in the ACB somehow doesn’t qualify Porzingis as “established.” Instead, he inexplicably bears the weight of previous international failures, though similar risks are not attached to other prospects. As Ford said:

“Established has nothing to do with it,” one long-time NBA scout told me in Vegas. “That’s code for, ‘I won’t get fired if I draft Okafor and he turns into Greg Oden. But I will get fired if Porzingis is the next Darko [Milicic].'”

Organizations, scouts, and executives that select foreign players have to be ready to accept the doubt of its fanbase because they find the unfamiliar unsettling. We treat the college game as a farm system; finding talent from an external source encourages criticism. It’s a presumed slight to domestic players. And if the pick doesn’t pan out, it’s an affirmation that what is known is best.

But that whole thought process seemingly dismisses the uncertainty of it all.

Plenty of top picks and top college players do not succeed in the NBA. Remember Ike Diogu? Sean May? Adam Morrison? Michael Beasley? Hasheem Thabeet? Jonny Flynn? Wes Johnson? Jimmer Fredette? Thomas Robinson?

None of those names will drag down any prospect in this year’s draft. They have no relevance to the circumstances of other college-trained players. But that should be obvious; there’s no reason any of those players’ histories should reflect upon the possibilities of anyone draft-eligible this year.

But the same should be said of Porzingis. He won’t be Pau Gasol or Dirk Nowitzki. Nor will he be Darko Milicic, Jan Vesely, or Yi Jianlian. His career has no template; it will take shape through his own efforts and skills, just as any other player. The tendency to typecast the possible scenarios for Porzingis’ career is a means of denying the unknown; it reduces his “potential” to the extreme ends that have played out for others coming from similar situations.

It’s assumed that it will take years to even catch a legitimate glimpse of Porzingis’ “potential.” But that’s often true of other rookies. Look at Mike Conley, Paul George, Gordon Hayward, Enes Kanter, and Klay Thompson. They all took years to become players of substantial impact.

Teams picking at the top of the draft can’t anticipate suddenly becoming competitive with the acquisition of one rookie. They can afford to be patient, and fans must understand that. In certain situations, they have to be patient if they want to see what can become of potential. Let’s just hope “potential” is provided the same luxury and isn’t rushed by the anxiety of the unknown.

Kristaps Porzingis is bound to take his bumps and bruises. There’s no way around that. And there is absolutely no guarantee he will succeed; any number of things can hinder his career.

But the fact remains: he has potential like any other, even if we tend to veil that fact with quotation marks we struggle to see through.

Prospecting Prospects Round Two: Vince Hunter, Dez Wells, and Aaron White

With the way most mockers and media treat the draft, you may be fooled into thinking the only players of relevance are gone within 30 picks. Adam Silver stops making the trot out to the podium just as so many speculative websites limit their pondering to the halfway point. The fact remains, however, that there are many more players trying to find their way into the NBA and 30 of them will at least be able to savor the moment Mark Tatum announces their names. Draft strategies often encourage the “draft-and-stash” tactic in the current NBA, but I wish to bring a bit of attention towards three late-projected players that I feel could have a legitimate chance to contribute early in their careers in the right situation.

As a practical matter, this will be fashioned in the same manner as the first Prospecting Prospects, which is to say the players are being addressed in alphabetical order without consideration to rating any one player over the other.

To begin, Vince Hunter has the skills to satisfy a very specific role: glass cleaner. The former UTEP Miner can consistently get around defenders and into position after the shot; he doesn’t rely upon camping out on the block and lucking into offensive rebounds. During one of the two games he participated in during the NBA Combine, Hunter was credited with nine offensive rebounds in 24 minutes! He wasn’t bashful about putting them back up either as he attempted the most shots (16) in that game, with 14 coming in the paint.

While he did make half of his attempts, an undeniable concern is that Hunter does not currently possess the frame (6’7.5″, 208 lbs.) to be as successful in the NBA. Four of his shots in that scrimmage were rejected, and he is not strong enough to expect to be able to bully his way towards the ball, let alone to go back up with it, with any regularity at the next level.

That does not discredit his motor, though; he will still earn tough rebounds, just not at a substantial volume until he adds some bulk. Hunter is somewhat similar to Kenneth Faried — an undersized, but athletic, power forward that will punish teams if they’re slacking with their box-outs — but he would be better served to add some mass and model his game after a similarly slotted role player like Reggie Evans. He will very likely need some work in the D-League, but if he can fill out his frame without losing his athleticism, he may find a steady roster spot after next season.

Dez Wells, however, does not fit so well into any particular mold. He is not exceptional in any one category and would not adequately fill a prescribed role. But in a league that worships versatility, particularly with the current trend that seemingly favors length over height, Wells could very well find a niche somewhere. While he is slightly on the short side for a shooting guard (6’4″), he has the length (6’10” wingspan) and strength (208 lbs.) to appeal to someone. (Note: Yes, Wells is the same weight as Hunter, but they bear different standards with the obvious difference being the positions they’d play.) Experienced at both guard spots, he is an able passer with good court vision, though he is too turnover-prone to trust as a point guard on a long-term basis. What is perhaps most telling of Wells as a prospect is that he demonstrated significant improvement as an outsider shooter, going from 33.7% on three-point attempts through his first three seasons in college to 51.0% as a senior at Maryland (he has never been dependent on outside shooting and has never attempted more than two per game for a season). Though some pundits will suggest that he is “too old” at 23 to develop, the staggering jump in his outside shooting percentage should establish his dedication towards honing his craft.

He is a player who wants to play — it’s as simple as that.

Rifling through all of his statistics and measurements won’t tell of the impact he had on his team at Maryland this past season. He reminds me of Draymond Green, a player with an uncertain position but vital nonetheless. When Melo Trimble’s production declined late in the season, Wells kept that team afloat. And while he likely won’t have a chance to be an essential member of a roster as a rookie, he could soon become a reliable leader of a second unit.

(**Character should always be a factor in drafting any prospect, so I feel it should be acknowledged that Wells was expelled from Xavier after being accused of sexual assault. However, Wells sued the university after he was never indicted and an investigation deemed that the case did not warrant prosecution. His lawsuit was settled out of court after Xavier’s motion for dismissal was refused. None of this provides sufficient insight into the circumstances concerning the alleged assault, or into Wells’ character, but it is a serious accusation that interested teams hopefully understand in greater detail before making a decision. That is not to suggest he deserves ridicule — the matter was investigated by the police and dismissed — but assaults are a devastatingly real problem, and should not be treated lightly.**)

Lastly, Iowa’s Aaron White may be able to bring a unique ability to the league that is not commonly found in power forwards today. White attacks the rim with aggression and is often rewarded with free throws, which he converts into points at a very good rate. Last season with the Hawkeyes, he attempted seven free throws per game and shot 81.9% from the stripe. Blake Griffin is the closest current NBA power forward to visiting the line with such frequency, but even so, he does not shoot as well from there as White. Of course, White won’t get the same opportunities he has capitalized upon in college and likely won’t replicate those numbers, but the tendency to attack the paint is a valuable attribute that will continue to pay dividends.

Detractors against White will voice the same criticisms facing Hunter and Wells: he is between positions. He is capable of either forward position, but is most likely expected to spend the vast majority of his time at power forward. He will have to add some muscle to compete for rebounds and handle the post. He is a reasonably good defender when playing passing lanes, but is far from a rim protector and may struggle against opponents that set up with one foot in the paint. His game will have to rely on finesse — think Darrell Arthur, just with an added penchant for drawing fouls.

None of these players are likely to hear Adam Silver declare to the world a team’s claim to their immediate basketball future. In fact, Mark Tatum may not do the honor either. There is absolutely no guarantee that these players will ever get the chance to play at the NBA level.

But that doesn’t mean they’re not capable.

Tankonomics and Tilling: Reasoning the 76ers’ Methods

August, 2012: after squeaking into the playoffs as the eighth seed the previous season despite a 20-9 record to open the season, the Philadelphia 76ers made a series of offseason moves expecting to recapture that tantalizing taste of success. The centerpiece? A trade netting a 24-year-old All-Star center with two gaudy championship rings to crowd his fingers.

The results? An utter disaster. The 76ers went 34-48 and missed the playoffs. The newly acquired Andrew Bynum that was to become their franchise player didn’t get to play. And he didn’t want to stay anyway. After sitting out the entire year with continual knee issues, Bynum left Philadelphia the next offseason to sign with the Cleveland Cavaliers without playing a single game as a 76er. Considering what became of Bynum’s career thereafter, it may not seem to have been such a big loss, but it was. The deal to acquire Bynum (and Jason Richardson) sent Andre Iguodala to the Denver Nuggets and it also required Philadelphia to relinquish the rights to three first round picks to the Orlando Magic (two of the picks were already drafted by the time of the trade; the other was a future selection, but more on that later). One of those picks, Nikola Vučević, has turned out to be quite valuable (Mo Harkless is a rotational player), while that trade and that season as a whole left the 76ers in shambles.

Veteran head coach Doug Collins resigned from his seat on the bench for one in the television studio, general manager Tony DiLeo — who was credited with orchestrating that trade alongside president of basketball operations Rod Thorn and given the position for doing so — fell out of the organization and wound up a Washington Wizards scout, and Thorn took off to become the president of basketball operations for the NBA. They gambled and lost, then effectively cleaned house.

The results of the ’12-’13 season paved the way for Sam Hinkie’s tankonomics, and as much as people may despise the strategy, it has been a means of pacifying the compounded mistakes that arose from that season. The tanking strategy was viable for the 76ers because they mortgaged their future in the transactions during that offseason; they were set to owe two first round picks if they made the playoffs in the coming years due to the Andrew Bynum trade and a trade for the draft rights to Arnett Moultrie. As the team has not made the playoffs since, the first of those lottery-protected picks (from the Moultrie deal) has been reduced to two second round picks — one this year and another next year. The other pick, however, has been retrieved through the Dario Šarić-Elfrid Payton trade that occurred last draft. By trading away any player of value (Thaddeus Young and Michael Carter-Williams), accepting other teams’ bad contracts (JaVale McGee), and posting horrific records, the 76ers have been able to acquire the most tempting of prospects — Nerlens Noel, Joel Embiid, and Šarić — without concern for their immediate availability as the stockpiling of lottery picks has been able to protect assets that were previously set to be shipped away. Simply put, the previous trades jeopardized the future stability of the franchise while also mucking up their immediate situation. Instead of plodding through seasons of mediocrity without much promise, converting the roster to mulch provided fertilizer for a harvest that may prove a sturdier yield; it may take some time for the crop to come in, but there will be more seasons to reap after these seasons of minimal stress on the fields.

So, should the news that Embiid’s foot hasn’t been healing as well as expected have any real effect on Hinkie’s plans going into this offseason? Not really. If Embiid is able to recover and dominate as he is reportedly doing even now, great. If not, Hinkie will continue to compile his seeds with patience. The harsh reality is that not every bud is bound to blossom. What is important is to collect them and keep planting them, treating each stalk with tender care so that they may have the opportunity to grow.

The fields had compacted after the Bynum trade; it was a feasible solution to clear the land and aerate the soil, however painful it has been to watch. But there is no need to rush for the scythe, for either Embiid’s career or the Philadelphia 76ers’ future.

Prospecting Prospects: Rondae Hollis-Jefferson, Tyus Jones, and Trey Lyles

Let’s face it: mock drafts are colossal wastes of time. There is absolutely no telling what any given team will do, particularly as trades inevitably shake everything all up. Yet…

We can’t help but be curious.

The draft, much like its lottery, embodies possibility: the possibility that your team will find a new face for its franchise, or that a new cog affixed within a contender will get its teeth in alignment and put everything in motion. Unfortunately, it is still an inexact science; there will be screw-ups. Potentially debilitating ones. Judging talent by the measurables and performances of prospects against players without the skills and knowledge of professionals runs the risk of one certainty: things won’t be the same at the next level. Roles will change, as will the competition. So your team drafted the strongest guy in the college game? Good for you. Just remember, he became the strongest after last year’s draft brought two others out of school and into the pros, though they were knocked around pretty easily. Oh, and that powerful frame won’t be able to stay on the court for long without knowing how to properly use it. And extensive conditioning. Dedication and adaptability determine success just as much as skill, but it sometimes just can’t be observed until the players are put into a position where failure is a real possibility.

As fans, we invest too much interest in the draft, but again, it can’t be helped. We want to catch a glimpse of our teams’ future potential as soon as possible, so we are bound to be overeager as the draft approaches and bury prospects in adulation and expectation before they even don a jersey.

In this post, however, I wish to focus on players that may be on a lot of fans’ radars as they seemingly bounce all over mock drafts throughout the internet — not with the burden of team-oriented fandom, but as a fan of these particular prospects; I am likely to watch them when I get the chance, wherever they end up. And while these players come from major universities across the country (and conferences), each of their games bear a resemblance to a Memphis Grizzly — at least as I see it.

To keep this orderly, I’ll be addressing the prospects alphabetically. This shouldn’t be misconstrued as a suggestion that any one player should go ahead of the other; I am privy to no greater knowledge about these players or interested teams than anyone that might happen upon these words. That is to say, public information is woefully lacking whenever considering any executive decision. Also, as these players are relatively high-profile, I won’t depend upon statistics and supply measurements; if you’re reading this, you probably have seen these players a few times. As noted before, those numbers have no immediate translation to the next level anyway. Alright, that’s enough of a disclaimer — onward to basketball matters!

Rondae Hollis-Jefferson is something of an enigma: he is versatile, yet a liability. Projected as a small forward, his defensive ability is nearly enough to earn him a rotational position for a steady career as a professional, with the feet and frame that suggest he should be able to guard 1-(stretch)4. He knows how to use his length as an on-ball defender on the perimeter, and does not surrender points in the paint even if he gets beat off the dribble. Unfortunately, his offensive game is an absolute question mark as whatever team gets a hold of him may force an overhaul of his jump shot. As of now, teams will not need to respect him in the corner, nor is he a threat with the ball in his hands. However, he is able to generate offense in transition opportunities and second chance points; his defense can create fast-breaks and leaving him alone on offense will making crashing the glass (a tendency and skill he already possesses) all the easier. Teams looking to draft Hollis-Jefferson will surely understand that they can’t expect his offensive contributions to be available every game — he capitalizes on the opponents’ mistakes — but he can effect games, even if it can’t be seen in the box score. Looking for an NBA comparison, I believe he is most like Tony Allen right now, an irritant that will fly all over the court for the ball, but one you worry about once he has it. Of course, Allen is an All-NBA defender so that is far too much to expect out of Hollis-Jefferson right now, but he fits that sort of mold, except with size closer to Andre Iguodala.

Next, we have my favorite player in college last year: Tyus Jones. While Jahlil Okafor drew the media attention, Jones was a highly touted recruit in his own right, and integral to Duke’s championship run. He is an intelligent conductor of the offense who knows when, and how, to get his own and when to distribute. Despite presumed athletic deficiencies, he simply controls the offense better than most point guards with his experience, fluidly changing paces. But while those athletic deficiencies are overblown, he will certainly be challenged by NBA point guards. He has capable hands able to agitate dribbles and anticipates passing lanes well, but he can be beat by a good first step — something most points guards have at that level. And this issue is complicated by his size; he can’t be hidden easily by changing his defensive responsibility as most players at other positions will have a major height (and probably weight) advantage. Even so, Jones is a proficient game manager on the offensive end. Though he doesn’t match in terms of athleticism or defensive prowess, I see a lot of Mike Conley in Jones. Conley is hardly ever celebrated, but is a fantastic point guard that facilitates his bigs very well and has developed his game off the ball. Jones grew up playing with Okafor and already has proven his shooting range. If not for the size difference (and Jones’ shooting ability), I would be compelled to compare him to Andre Miller.

Lastly, Trey Lyles is an enticing mix of size and offensive skill. The crowding in Kentucky’s frontcourt forced Lyles to split his time at both forward positions, and flexibility is never a bad thing in the NBA. However, most analyses suggest he will be cast as a stretch four, with possible minutes to be found at center in small-ball situations. That is somewhat reasonable; his game is best suited for the baseline. But he plays much smoother than would be expected of most power forwards; his footwork and dribbling makes him more than a catch-and-shoot prop waiting in the corner — he’s actually not a strong three point shooter, though the form is there — as he is able to drive and back-down well. He can operate on his own, yet remains aware of his teammates’ movement while in iso and is a willing passer. His defense, though, is slightly more problematic to judge, not for his own play, but because he played alongside Willie Cauley-Stein and Karl Anthony-Towns. His defensive tendencies may have been effected by the knowledge that help would be imminent. With that said, he accepted the challenge of playing out of position, and the only real problem was matching explosiveness. Struggling against more athletic players could pose an enormous issue in the NBA, but it should be mitigated once shifted back against bigs. Considering that he is slated to play power forward and center instead of both forward positions, my comparison is less useful towards projecting his pro game, but Lyles reminded me of Jeff Green during his collegiate career. He can open up the court and make for a reliable post-scorer. Paul Millsap may be more reasonable, but again, I mean that in terms of play style; Millsap has developed substantially throughout his career and it would be ridiculous to suggest that Lyles is prepared to perform in the NBA at the All-Star level.

That goes for every rookie: they are rookies! We celebrate them similar to a child: they harness potential, but it is ultimately up to the maturation process whether or not we ever see anything more than that. Some mature swiftly, then plateau. Some are late bloomers. Some never blossom at all. And even knowing that, we will sit and wait for whatever name(s) Adam Silver announces for our teams on June 25, then pile on the pressure to see what our future holds. After all…

We can’t help but be curious.

Proposed Revision for the NBA Draft Lottery

Yes, yes, the NBA Finals are already underway, but that really only concerns the Cleveland Cavaliers and Golden State Warriors. Front offices throughout the league are busying themselves preparing for the NBA Draft set for June 25. And while the order has already been set by this year’s lottery, it remains a point of contention.

The whole idea behind using a lottery to determine the first three picks of the draft is to discourage deliberate losing (“tanking”). This system, in its current state, limits the worst team to a 25% chance of obtaining the first pick, and guarantees they receive no less than the fourth pick. Every team that fails to make the playoffs has a chance, however slim, to win the lottery and move up in the draft. Though this arrangement clearly hasn’t eliminated tanking — just look at the Knicks and 76ers this season — it hasn’t solely rewarded the tankers either. This year, with the Minnesota Timberwolves having their four number combination of ping-pong balls selected (one of their 250 variations), it is only the fifth time the best odds proved fruitful since the lottery was implemented in the NBA in 1985.

Even so, NBA owners are in favor of change. Just this last offseason season, a new proposal received a majority of votes from the league’s board of governors. However, it failed to pass, receiving only 17 of the 23 required votes necessary for action. The intention is to reduce the odds for the teams with the worst records, giving everyone else a better chance to jump up to the top six (not the current three) spots.

Arguments against the proposal suggested it would encourage teams on the cusp of a playoff berth to tank, while it would have no effect on the season-long tankers at all. The former notion makes some sense. If you’re in the Eastern Conference and at risk of making the playoffs with a sub .500 record, you would most likely rather have a chance of ending up with a top six pick instead of the 15th and an early exit from postseason play. That is reasonable in the long-run of developing a franchise, but somewhat counterintuitive. The objective of playing in the NBA (if your motivations are pure) is to aim for a title. Even if the front office decides to play the role of seller at the trade deadline, players don’t care about lottery position. They care about ensuring they have a roster position, and the best way to go about that is to win. Members of the Knicks can tell you that; they won “too many games” late in the season, according to their fans, but most of those players were essentially auditioning for roles next season. If they gave up, who would want them? And anyway, playoff runs, however brief, are necessary experience in order to progress. A roster full of players with a playoff series under their belt has pieces far more likely to contribute than most rookies.

Concerning full-on tankers, any proposal likely won’t deter their plan of action. The lottery, however, has the potential to punish such franchises. As I already mentioned, the worst record has only obtained the best pick — “best” only meaning first, there’s absolutely no guarantee it will work out — five times in 30 years. Without a lottery, tanking becomes much more aggressive as records immediately translate to draft position. With any lottery, the dispersal of opportunities reduces the viability of tanking, and that is all we can really hope for.

And with all of that said, I have my own idea for revising the chances to win the draft lottery: (The team with the worst record will be designated Team 1 and the best will be Team 14)

Teams 1 and 2: 12.5% chance to win the lottery

Teams 3 and 4: 10%

Teams 5-8: 7.5%

Teams 9-12: 5%

Teams 13 and 14: 2.5%

In my proposal, the top four picks are available via the lottery; the worst team would be guaranteed no worse than the fifth pick after all other picks are determined by record. Leveling out the odds may reduce tanking as those odds are far greater for all but the five worst teams than they are now; Teams 11-14 have less than a 1% chance in the current system and only Teams 1-6 have at least a 5% to win the lottery. This breakdown would effectively halve the value of the worst record, going from 25% to 12.5%. The reduced chances for Teams 13 and 14 is only to discourage purposefully falling out of the playoffs. However, most teams in these seeds are likely competing for a playoff position and may just fall short. There can’t really be a penalty for that — the Thunder should not face unnecessary punishment for their efforts this season. Besides, 2.5% is far more than the 0.6% and 0.5% chance Teams 13 and 14, respectively, have now so it shouldn’t be seen too negatively.

Of course, this idea, like any other, surely has its critics. As it stands, Team 14 has 1/50 of the chance Team 1 does; my proposal closes that gap to 1/5. Teams that naturally fall on a hard season would probably like to see some compensation for their dejected fans (i.e. the Milwaukee Bucks and Jabari Parker). And playoff contenders don’t want rivals they kept out of the playoffs to suddenly come back next season with a shiny, new franchise cornerstone.

Unless the NBA goes the route of the NFL with a fully stabilized draft slotting (based on records and playoff progression), there will always be a chance things won’t fall in your team’s favor, but that’s what makes it exhilarating. Maybe with a more balanced system, there might be a reason to tune in when they announce the results with a realistic hope your team’s ping pong balls were pulled from the contraption.

Then again, I already watch every year without much hope. That’s just the nature of a lottery.